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PUNISHING AND PREVENTING POLLUTION IN JAPAN:
IS AMERICAN-STYLE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT THE
SOLUTION?
Robert G. Kondratt
Abstract: Both Japan and the United States face the ongoing threat of intentional
and preventable pollution. From 1970 until the mid-1980s, Japan utilized its
environmental crime laws to punish and prevent intentional and preventable acts of
pollution. After this period, however, the number of environmental crime arrests and
prosecutions in Japan declined. In contrast, since the 1980s, the United States has
continued to expand the number of prosecutors and investigators dedicated to the
enforcement of environmental crime laws. These divergent trends can be explained by
the different pollution histories, enforcement personnel structures, regulatory strategies,
and case law of the two countries. In recent years, Japan has been plagued by large oil
spills and the illegal disposal of industrial waste. By aggressively enforcing its
environmental crime laws and increasing criminal fines, Japan can better deter these
types of pollution in the future.
1. INTRODUCTION
In 1970, Japan became the first nation in the world to provide criminal
sanctions for acts of pollution' that endanger human health.2 Japan's
innovative pollution control laws established an important precedent for
other industrialized nations, including the United States.3 Over the past two
decades, however, Japan's enforcement of its environmental crime laws has
decreased. In contrast, officials in the United States have rapidly expanded
the number of prosecutors and investigators dedicated to the enforcement of
environmental crime laws. Despite facing similar environmental problems,4
I A.B., 1998, Duke University, Environmental Sciences and Policy, Biology, J.D. expected 2001,
University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to thank Professor John 0. Haley for his
helpful insight into Japanese law and society, Bob and Vivian Kondrat for their generous support, and
Lawrence Lincoln and Helen Brunner for being mentors in federal environmental crime prosecution.
1 Environmental crime laws could also include laws related to fish and wildlife (i.e., those that
punish poaching), endangered species protection, and nuclear energy and radioactive substances. This
Comment, however, is limited to an examination of environmental crime laws governing pollution caused
by releases of harmful substances into the air, soil, and water.
2 MARGARET A. MCKEAN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEST AND CITIZEN POLITICS IN JAPAN 20-21
(1981). The United States had laws at this time that prohibited the disposal of waste in designated
waterways, but they were intended to protect navigation and did not make the endangerment of human
health a crime. See infra note 60.
3 For a discussion of the similarities between the environmental laws of the United States and Japan,
see generally Susan Ridgley, Environmental Protection Agreements in Japan and the United States, 5 PAC.
RIM L. & POL'Y J. 639 (1996).
4 David P. Hackett, Environmental Regulation in Japan, INT'L ENVTL. L. SPECIAL REP. 329, 329
(1992).
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these two nations have moved in different directions with regard to the
enforcement of their environmental crime laws.
Recently, however, Japan has begun to rediscover the value of its
criminal enforcement program. In 1998, Japan's National Police Agency
announced that waste disposal companies that continued to dump waste
illegally after receiving warnings from the local government would be
promptly arrested.5 The police, true to their warnings, made a series of
arrests for violations of waste disposal laws.6  An announcement by the
National Police Agency boldly proclaimed a new direction for the
enforcement of environmental crime laws in Japan: "We are going to
demand criminal charges under every law we can, not only the laws on
waste disposal but also those on air and water pollution."7
This Comment examines trends in the enforcement of environmental
crime laws in Japan and the United States and evaluates Japan's current
prosecution efforts. Part II provides an overview of Japan's environmental
crime laws. Part III describes the different trends in environmental crime
enforcement in the United States and Japan over the past thirty years and
presents historical and contemporary explanations for these different trends.
Part IV argues that Japan should continue to strengthen its enforcement of
environmental crime laws, particularly those related to oil spills and
industrial waste disposal, in order to better deter these types of pollution in
the future.
II. OVERVIEW OF JAPAN'S CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT LAWS
In 1970, a special session of the Japanese Diet ("Diet") initiated a new
era of environmental protection in Japan. During this session, the Diet
passed or amended fourteen laws8 that were designed to reduce and prevent
5 Dumpers to Be Charged, ASAHI SHINBUN, June 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12788416.
6 In June 1998, Kyoto prefectural police sought to bring criminal charges against four companies
and a total of 87 employees and employers for violations of 10 pollution laws. Id. In August 1999, the
police arrested officials from waste-producing firms for the first time. Police Arrest 4 in Illegal Disposal of
Used Oil, Japan Econ. Newswire, Aug. 24, 1999, available in WESTLAW, Japan Econ. Newswire. Four
officials from three oil refining firms were arrested for failing to draw up legal contracts to dispose of 1,000
drums of used oil. Id.
7 Dumpers to Be Charged, supra note 5. In support of this pronouncement, 36 police officers were
loaned from prefectural police headquarters to the industrial waste departments of local governments. The
officers accompanied local government officials on inspections of industrial waste disposal sites and
stakeouts of illegal dumps. Id.
8 The amended laws included the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control, the Air Pollution
Control Law, the Noise Regulation Law, the Road Traffic Law, the Sewage Law, the Natural Parks Law,
the Poisonous and Hazardous Substances Control Law, and the Agricultural Chemicals Regulation Law.
Chao-chan Cheng, A Comparative Study of the Formation and Development of Air & Water Pollution
VOL. 9 No. 2
MAY 2000 ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME IN JAPAN
pollution,9 giving Japan the strictest anti-pollution laws in the world.'0
Among these was the first law to criminalize acts of pollution that endanger
of human health.' Prior to the passage of these laws, the principal law
imposing criminal sanctions for acts of pollution in Japan was contained in
the Criminal Code, which criminalizes negligent acts that cause death or
injury' 2 and the intentional pollution of drinking water.' 3  The new laws
substantially broadened the scope of criminal liability for acts of pollution.
14
The Law for Punishment of Crimes Relating to Environmental
Pollution Pertaining to Human Health 15 ("Environmental Pollution Crime
Law") was perhaps the most revolutionary environmental law passed by the
Diet in 1970.16 This law was Japan's first attempt to levy economic
sanctions or penalties on polluters whose pollution activities jeopardized
public health. 17  The Environmental Pollution Crime Law punishes
intentional, as well as negligent, acts of pollution.' 8  Unlike the Criminal
Control Laws in Taiwan and Japan, 3 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. S-43, S-69 (1993). The new laws included
the Law Concerning Entrepreneurs' Bearing of the Cost of Public Pollution Control Works, the Law for
Punishment of Environmental Pollution Crimes Relating to Human Health, the Water Pollution Control
Law, the Marine Pollution Prevention Law, the Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law, and the Law
Relating to Soil Pollution Control in Arable Lands. Id.
9 McKEAN, supra note 2, at 20-21. For this reason, the 1970 Diet became known as the "Pollution
Diet." Id.
10 JEFFERY BROADBENT, ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS IN JAPAN: NETWORKS OF POWER AND PROTEST
20 (1998). Broadbent refers to this event as the "pollution miracle." Id.
11 MCKEAN, supra note 2, at 21. The particular statute was the Law for Punishment of Crimes
Relating to Environmental Pollution Pertaining to Human Health. Hito no Kenk6 ni Kakaru Kogai Hanzai
no Shobatsu ni Kansuru H6ritsu [Law for Punishment of Crimes Relating to Environmental Pollution
Pertaining to Human Health] (adopted Dec. 25, 1970) Law No. 142 [hereinafter Environmental Pollution
Crime Law], reprinted in ROPPO ZENSHO [COMPENDIUM OF LAWS] 2864 (1999), translated in 7 EHS LAW
BULL. SERIES YB (1996) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS (1996)]. This law has also been referred to
as the "Law on Punishment of Pollution Offenses Affecting Human Health," the "Law for the Punishment
of Crises Relating to Environmental Pollution," and the "Law for Punishment of Environmental Pollution
Crimes Relating to Human Health." Hiroshi Oda, The Role of Criminal Law in Pollution Control, in
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN JAPAN 183, 183 (Shigeto Tsuru & Helmut Weidner eds., 1989); George F.
Curran III, Pacific Rim Environmental Regulation: A Western Perspective of Several Countries'
Environmental Liability Laws, 3 J. INT'L L. & PRAC. 47, 51 (1994); ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF
THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 136 (1975) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1975)].
12 Keih6 [Criminal Code] (adopted Apr. 24, 1907, multiple amendments) Law No. 45, reprinted in
ROPPO ZENSHO [COMPENDIUM OF LAWS] 2843 (1999), translated in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SERIES PA (1996).
See Oda, supra note 11, at 183 (discussing Articles 204 and 205).
13 See Oda, supra note 11, at 183 (discussing Articles 142 to 146).
14 The Criminal Code was first adopted in 1907. Id. The Criminal Code was seldom used in
pollution cases for a variety of reasons. Id. at 187. First, there was great difficulty in proving the causal
relationship between an act of pollution and death or injury. Id. It was also difficult to prove negligence
under the statute. Id.
15 Environmental Pollution Crime Law, supra note 11, at YB 1-YB 2.
16 JULIAN GRESSER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN JAPAN 261 (1981).
1d. at261 &n.208.
1S Oda, supra note 11, at 185.
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Code, which punishes negligent acts only when they cause actual harm to
human health, the Environmental Pollution Crime Law punishes negligent
acts that pose a risk to human health, even if there is no showing of actual
harm.' 9  While the Environmental Pollution Crime Law was conceptually
innovative when it was passed, its scope is limited in a number of ways,
and it has rarely been used.2'
Two frequently employed environmental crime laws in Japan are the
Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law ("Waste Disposal Law")22 and
the Law Concerning Prevention of Marine Pollution and Marine Disasters
("Marine Pollution Law").2 3 The Waste Disposal Law was passed to prevent
injuries to public health caused by the disposal of waste and toxic
chemicals. 24  It requires business owners to provide notice to the Japanese
government before importing, manufacturing, or using new chemicals.
25
The Marine Pollution Law governs the discharge of oil and waste from
'9 Id. at 185-86. Under Articles 204 and 205 of the Criminal Code, it is only a crime to cause actual
injury or death through negligence. Id. at 183, 186. Article 3 of the Environmental Pollution Crime Law
addresses pollution crimes involving negligence. ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS (1996), supra note 11, at YB l-
YB 2.
20 Oda, supra note 11, at 185. First, the Environmental Pollution Crime Law only governs industrial
pollution emitted in the course of entrepreneurial activities and does not extend to pollution by citizens. Id.
Second, the law only targets water and air pollution and does not deal with other types of pollution. Id.
Finally, the law does not address pollution incidents involving multiple discharges that jointly cause
damage. Id. The overall purpose of the law is to prevent pollution affecting human health by punishing
acts of pollution that are undertaken in the course of business. Id. Article 1 emphasizes that the law works
in coordination with other measures, implying that criminal sanctions are neither the only nor the primary
means to prevent pollution. Id.
21 See GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261 & n.209. In 1976, only four cases were referred to the
prosecutor's office under the Environmental Pollution Crime Law. Id. By 1989, there were only four court
judgments involving the law. Oda, supra note 11, at 188. In 1993, only one person was reported for
violating the law. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 711 (1995)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995)]. An Environment Agency report is also called a "White Paper
on the Environment." Preface to ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN
(1980) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1980)). It is an annual report on the environment that is
submitted to the Diet pursuant to Article 7 of the Basic Law for Environmental Pollution Control. Id.
22 Haikibutsu no Shori Oyobi Seis6 ni Kansuru Hfritsu [Waste Disposal and Public Cleansing Law]
(adopted Dec. 25, 1970, multiple amendments) Law No. 137 [hereinafter Waste Disposal Law], reprinted
in ROPPO ZENSHO [COMPENDIUM OF LAWS] 2034 (1999), translated in ENVIRONMENT AGENCY,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS IN JAPAN 10 (1976) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
(1976)]. See also Curran III, supra note 11, at 52.
23 Kaiy6 Osen Oyobi KaijO Saigai no B6shi ni Kansuru H6ritusu [Law Concerning Prevention of
Marine Pollution and Marine Disasters] (adopted Dec. 25, 1970, multiple amendments) Law No. 136
[hereinafter Marine Pollution Law], reprinted in ROPPO ZENSHO [COMPENDIUM OF LAWS] 1969 (1999),
translated in 7 EHS LAW BULL. SERIES YE (1970).24 Curran III, supra note 11, at 52.
25 Id.
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ships 26 and provides fines of up to ten million yen (approximately $100,000)
for oil spills.
27
The other significant environmental crime laws in Japan relate to
regulatory compliance enforcement. The two most prominent laws in this
area are the Law on Prevention of Water Pollution ("Water Pollution Control
Law") 28 and the Law on Prevention of Air Pollution ("Air Pollution Control
Law").29 Unlike the Environmental Pollution Crime Law, which punishes
those who harm or endanger human health, these laws punish industrial
facilities and responsible company officials who violate emission standards
or fail to comply with administrative orders that direct them to install
pollution control devices. 30 Under the Air Pollution Control Law, violators
are subject to punishment if they (1) fail to observe emission standards, (2)
fail to comply with an administrative order to change a plan for installment
of pollution control devices, or (3) submit false reports to an administrative
agency. 3 The Water Pollution Control Law contains similar provisions.
32
While Japan's Environment Agency 33  generally sets the
environmental policies, standards, and objectives to be achieved, regulatory
enforcement and implementation of these standards is the responsibility of
local governments. 34 Japan's forty-seven prefectures 35 oversee and monitor
industries within their respective jurisdictions to ensure compliance with
various environmental laws.36 Local governments are authorized to regulate
environmental issues through private pollution control contracts between
industrial plants and the communities in which they are located.37
26 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 294 (1987) [hereinafter
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1987)].
27 Oil Spill Culprits Jumping Bail, DAILY YOMIUR, Oct. 25, 1996, available in 1996 WL 13028056.
28 Suishitsu Odaku Bbshi H6 [Water Pollution Prevention Law] (adopted Dec. 25, 1970, multiple
amendments) Law No. 138 [hereinafter Water Pollution Control Law], reprinted in ROPPO ZENSHO
[COMPENDIUM OF LAWS] 1956 (1999), translated in 7 EHS LAW BULL. SERIES YD (1996).
29 Taiki Osen Bbshi H6 [Air Pollution Prevention Law] (adopted June 10, 1968, multiple
amendments) Law No. 97 [hereinafter Air Pollution Control Law], reprinted in ROPPO ZENSHO
[COMPENDIUM OF LAWS] 1948 (1999), translated in 7 EHS LAW BULL. SERIES YC (1996). The 1970
amendments added criminal sanctions. Oda, supra note 11, at 186.
30 Oda, supra note 1l, at 186.31 1d. at 186-87.
32 Id. at 187.
33 The Environment Agency is an executive body under the Prime Minister's Office and is headed by
a director general, who is a member of the Cabinet and holds the rank of state minister. GRESSER ET AL.,
supra note 16, at 234. The Environment Agency has four principal bureaus: Planning and Coordination,
Nature Conservation, Air Quality, and Water Quality. Id.
34 Curran III, supra note 11, at 51.
35 Ridgley, supra note 3, at 51 & n.16. A prefecture is a localized government institution somewhat
analogous to an American state. Id.
6 Curran Ill, supra note 11, at 51.
3" Id. at 52.
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Prefectures are also authorized to adopt regulations with criminal
sanctions, provided that the sanctions do not include imprisonment
exceeding two years. 38 Under the Air Pollution Control Law, for example, a
prefectural governor may request that the owner of an industrial facility
supply emissions data, and prefectural officials are authorized to inspect
industrial facilities on a regular basis.39  Under Article 14, prefectural
governors also have the authority to order industrial facilities to reduce the
level of pollutants in emissions or to suspend the operations of facilities
when they are in violation of emission standards and pose a risk to human
health or the environment.40  Article 33 subjects individuals who fail to
comply with an order from the governor to imprisonment and criminal
fines. 4 1
In summary, Japan's environmental crime laws provide a solid
statutory foundation for the prosecution of a variety of crimes related to
different acts of pollution. However, as a senior official of the Environment
Agency once declared, "Having laws enacted is not enough. They must be
enforced., 42  As explained in Part III, Japan's environmental crime laws
have not been enforced with the same rigor as those in the United States.
III. DIFFERENCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME PROSECUTION PATTERNS IN
JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Trends in the Enforcement of Environmental Crime Laws
in Japan
Japan's environmental crime laws have been enforced with varying
degrees of intensity since they were enacted in 1970. The enforcement of
most non-marine environmental crime laws in Japan originates with the
police.43 The National Police Agency has a special section that deals with
38 Oda, supra note 11, at 187. A number of municipalities and prefectures have passed ordinances
that govern pollution. MCKEAN, supra note 2, at 243. They often include higher pollution standards and
stiffer fines and jail terms than the laws passed at the national level by the Diet. Id.
39 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 260-61.
40 ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS (1996), supra note 11, at YC 18-19.
41 Id. at YC 42.
42 Saburo Kawanishi, Foreword to ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN
JAPAN (1976) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1976)].
43 Cases involving oil spills from vessels fall within the jurisdiction of the Maritime Safety Agency
("MSA"). See ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1987), supra note 26, at 294; see also ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
(1995), supra note 21, at 662. Besides handling cases involving the Marine Pollution Law, the MSA also
handles cases involving the Water Pollution Control Law and the Waste Disposal Law. See ENVIRONMENT
AGENCY (1987), supra note 26, at 294. Between 1981 and 1983, the MSA referred 4,101 cases to
authorities. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 206 (1984) [hereinafter
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pollution cases. 44 The police in turn refer pollution cases to the Public
Prosecutor's Office, which is staffed by prosecutors that specialize in
pollution crimes.45 Local environmental administrators can also refer cases
to criminal prosecutors, but for the reasons discussed below, this is rarely
done.46
Since almost all persons arrested for environmental crimes are
referred for prosecution,47  one of the most effective indicators of the
enforcement of environmental crime laws in Japan is the number of arrests
made by police. 48 Figure 1 shows the number of arrests made by the police
for environmental crimes. During the first nine years of criminal
enforcement (1971 to 1979), the number of arrests grew substantially every
year.49 Arrests peaked in 1984, a year in which the Environment Agency
proudly announced that the number of arrests for "vicious" offenses was
increasing. 50 After 1985, however, there was a dramatic five-year decrease
in arrests.: Through the early 1990s, arrest numbers remained at pre-1974
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984)]. The MSA monitors and controls marine pollution in Japanese waters
with patrol boats, helicopters, and aircraft. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 662.
44 Oda, supra note 11, at 189.
45 Id. Prosecutors in Japan are sometimes referred to as procurators. A. Didrick Castberg,
Prosecutorial Independence, 16 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 38, 38 n. 1 (1997). Procurators are responsible for
prosecuting criminal charges on behalf of the state and serve a function similar to district attorneys and
federal prosecutors in the United States. MCKEAN, supra note 2, at 68-69.
46 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261.
4' Between 1991 and 1994, police referred between 96% and 98% of the reported violations for
prosecution. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 710.
49 While these figures only include cases involving the police and not maritime pollution cases
involving the MSA, they do reflect overall trends.
49 One 1980 report noted that there had been a "steady increase in recent years in the number of
criminal prosecutions for pollution-related offenses." Marshall Lee Miller et al., Environmental Law in
Japan: An Overview, 2 E. ASIAN EXEC. REP. 3, 20 (1980). The specific arrest figures are: 1971 (482),
1972 (791), 1973 (1,727), 1974 (2,856), 1975 (3,572), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1976), supra note 42, at
221; 1976 (4,697), 1977 (4,827), 1978 (5,383), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN
JAPAN 257 (1979) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1979)]; 1979 (5,855), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
(1980), supra note 21, at 292; 1980 (5,456), 1981 (5,374), 1982 (5,637), 1983 (5,983), ENVIRONMENT
AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 274; 1984 (6,902), 1985 (6,805), 1986 (4,113), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
(1987), supra note 26, at 293; 1987 (4,289), 1988 (3,350), 1989 (2,075), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, QUALITY
OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN 401 (1990) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1990)]; 1990 (1,946),
1991 (2,028), 1992 (1,835), 1993 (2,024), 1994 (2,365), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at
708.
so The Environment Agency later stated that these offenses included failing to install wastewater
treatment facilities, avoiding the use of treatment facilities in order to cut costs, and discharging untreated
wastewater through illegal drainage in order to avoid effluent standards. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984),
supra note 43, at 275. The Environment Agency also noted that a number of offenses were committed by
local public bodies, including city-run meat works. Id.
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1987), supra note 26, at 293. Between 1985 and 1989, the total number
of arrests for pollution offenses dropped from 6,805 to 2,075. Annual water pollution arrests decreased
from 494 to 45, and annual waste disposal arrests dropped from 6,261 to 2,019. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
(1990), supra note 49, at 401.
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levels.
52
The vast majority of environmental crime arrests have been for
violations of the Waste Disposal Law. 53 Of the remaining arrests, most have
been for violations of the Water Pollution Control Law.54  The number of
arrests for violations of these laws has decreased in a manner consistent with
the overall decrease in the number of arrests since 1984. 55 There have been
virtually no arrests for violations of the Air Pollution Control Law, the
Environmental Pollution Crime Law, and other environmental laws since the
1980s. 5 6  Another indicator of the intensity of environmental crime
prosecution, the indictment rate,57 has also dropped. The indictment rate,
which was as high as 69% in 1972,58 dropped to 55.8% in 1990. 59
52 FNVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 708.
53 Oda, supra note 11, at 188. The proportion of arrests for violations of the Waste Disposal Law
has increased over time: 1978 (85.4% of arrests), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1979), supra note 49, at 258;
1986 (93.7% of arrests), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1987), supra note 26, at 293; 1994 (98.3% of arrests),
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 708.
5 Some of the leading violators of water pollution effluent standards are the food industry (30.2%),
the metal product manufacturing industry (20.2%), and the cement product manufacturing industry
(11.2%). ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 275. The specific Water Pollution Control Law
arrest figures are: 1975 (291), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1976), supra note 42, at 221; 1978 (340),
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1979), supra note 49, at 258; 1979 (860), 1980 (829), 1981 (664), 1982 (692),
1983 (668), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 274; 1984 (745), 1985 (494), 1986 (210),
1987 (211), 1988 (150), 1989 (45), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1990), supra note 49, at 515; 1990 (52), 1991
(51), 1992 (34), 1993 (29), 1994 (18), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 708.
55 In 1994, for example, of the 2,365 pollution arrests, only 18 arrests were for violations of the
Water Pollution Control Law. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 708.
56 Between 1993 and 1994, there was only one reported violation of the Environmental Pollution
Crime Law, and there were no reported criminal violations of the Air Pollution Control Law.
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 711. In 1986, while 4,113 people were arrested for
pollution crimes, only 3.6% of these arrests were for violations of the Water Pollution Control Law. There
were only two cases involving the Air Pollution Control Law. Oda, supra note 11, at 188. In 1979, there
were 5,855 arrests. ENVIRONMENT AGEI.CY (1984), supra note 43, at 274. There were 312 arrests for
violations of the Water Pollution Control Law (5.3%), and 113 arrests (1.9%) for violations of the River
Law. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1980), supra note 21, at 293. Figures for pollution arrests by police (these
figures do not include MSA arrests) for violations of laws other than the Waste Disposal Law and Water
Pollution Control Act are: 1975 (864), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1979), supra note 49, at 257; 1979 (217),
1980 (225), 1981 (189), 1982 (217), 1983 (87), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 274; 1984
(97), 1985 (50), 1986 (17), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1987), supra note 26, at 293; 1987 (20), 1988 (2),
1989 (11), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1990), supra note 49, at 401; 1990 (4), 1991 (7), 1992 (13), 1993 (3),
1994 (8), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 708.
17 The indictment ratio can be calculated by dividing the number of persons indicted by the total
number of persons referred for prosecution. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 710.
58 Of 2,177 cases received by the Public Prosecutor's Office, 1,492 resulted in indictments.
GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 469 n.211.
51 Indictment ratios in the 1990s were as follows: 1991 (57.7%), 1992 (59.1%), 1993 (56.0%), 1994
(62.6%). ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 710. In 1994, the overall indictment ratio for
environmental pollution offenses was 62.6%. The indictment ratios for the Waste Disposal Law, the Water
Pollution Control Law, and the Marine Pollution Law were 68.5%, 65.5%, and 49.1%, respectively. Id. at
712. The indictment ratio was as high as 73% in 1977. GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 469 n.21 1.
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B. The Expansion of Environmental Crime Prosecution in the United
States
In contrast to Japan, environmental crime prosecution in the United
States has expanded rapidly over the past two decades. Although there have
been criminal penalties for certain environmental violations in the United
States since 1899,60 most environmental crime provisions were added after
1970.61 Until the early 1980s, however, most of the laws in existence were
rarely enforced. During the 1970s, only twenty-five environmental crimes
were prosecuted at the federal level.62 This trend changed dramatically in
the early 1980s, when the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
created a new Office of Criminal Enforcement, 63 and the Department of
Justice ("DOJ") created the Environmental Crimes Unit (now called thz
Environmental Crimes Section).64 These changes brought about a dramatic
increase in the number of prosecutions and the amount of fines imposed.65
Between 1983 and 1986, the number of indictments for environmental
Ratios were very similar a decade later. In 1986, for example, the indictment rate was 72%. Oda, supra
note 11, at 188.
60 The Refuse Act of 1899, 30 Stat. 1152, and the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 30
Stat. 1148, were the first U.S. laws to provide criminal penalties for environmental harm. These laws were
intended to maintain the navigability of waters, and were not intended to protect human health or the
environment. The laws authorized fines of up to $2,500 and up to one year in prison for the disposal of
refuse or waste in designated navigable waterways and for the excavation or filling in of navigable
waterways without authorization. DONALD A. CARR ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
AVOIDING AND DEFENDING ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 1 (1995).
61 See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.)
1954, 1968; Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 308, 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. (91 Stat.)
685, 780; Clean Water Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816; Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767
(1980); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA"), Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976);
CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 3-4, 6.
62 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5.
63 The Office of Criminal Enforcement was created in 1981. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE
("ELI"), ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES DESKBOOK 7 (1996) [hereinafter ELI]. In October 1982, the first group
of experienced criminal investigators reported to work at the EPA. Id. This has been recognized as the
official birthday of the federal government's criminal environmental enforcement program. See Helen J.
Brunner, Environmental Criminal Enforcement: A Retrospective View, 22 ENVTL. L. 1315 (1992).
64 F. Henry Habicht II, The Federal Perspective on Environmental Criminal Enforcement: How to
Remain on the Civil Side, 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 10478, 10479 (1987). The Environmental Crimes Unit was
established in November 1982 and focused on RCRA cases, complex cases, multidistrict cases, and cases
for which a U.S. Attorney requested assistance from the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). CARR ET AL.,
supra note 60, at 9. When the group was upgraded to a permanent section within the Environment and
Natural Resources Division of DOJ in 1987, it was given primary responsibility for the prosecution of any
matter referred by the EPA. Id. By 1992, the Environmental Crimes Section had grown to 28 attorneys.
ELI, supra note 63, at 7.
65 The average fine in an environmental crime case L now $1.9 million. Thomas M. Downs, The
Enforcement Pipeline: A Significant Discharge of Environmental Enforcement Cases, SD19 ALI-ABA
199, 204 (1998), available in WESTLAW, Texts & Periodicals-All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar Journals.
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crimes doubled, the number of guilty pleas and convictions increased by
300%, criminal fines increased by 600%, and jail time increased by
1300%.
66
Criminal enforcement continued to expand throughout the 1980s and
1990s 67 and-was further strengthened when Congress passed the Pollution
Prosecution Act of 1990.68 The law called for a 400% increase in the
number of EPA criminal investigators.69 In fiscal year ("FY") 1990, the
Environmental Crimes Section obtained 134 indictments for environmental
crimes and had an overall conviction rate of 95%.70 This was the largest
number of indictments ever recorded in its history and a 33% increase over
FY 1989.71 Between FY 1995 and FY 1996, criminal fines tripled from $23
million to $76.6 million.72 The EPA has also continued to expand its
criminal enforcement efforts.73
C. Explanations for Why Criminal Enforcement Has Been Less Prevalent
in Japan Than in the United States
1. Different Pollution Histories
One important consideration in understanding the current difference in
enforcement strategies in the United States and Japan is public opinion
regarding the criminalization of acts of pollution. Prosecutors in the United
66 Edward F. Novak & Charles W. Steese, Survey of Federal and State Environmental Crime
Legislation, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 571, 572 (1992).67 ELI, supra note 63, at 87. While there was some annual variation, the number of guilty pleas and
convictions continued to increase between 1983 and 1994. The figures are: fiscal year ("FY") 1983 (40),
FY 1984 (32), FY 1985 (37), FY 1986 (67), FY 1987 (86), FY 1988 (63), FY 1989 (107), FY 1990 (85),
FY 1991 (96), FY 1992 (104), FY 1993 (168), FY 1994 (124). Id.
68 Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101B593, § 202(a), 104 Stat. 2962 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (1994)). CARR ETAL., supra note 60, at 5.
69 JOEL A. MINTZ, ENFORCEMENT AT THE EPA: HIGH STAKES AND HARD CHOICES 93 (1990). Two
American commentators summed up the effect of this law by observing, "It is a serious understatement to
say that the enforcement of corporate environmental crime has been in rapid evolution in the last few
years." Donald A. Can & William L. Thomas, Devising a Compliance Strategy Under the ISO 14000
Environmental Management Standards, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 85, 88 (1997).
70 Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Criminal Liability for
Violations of Environmental Statutes in the 1990s, 16 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 201, 204 (1991). Between
October I, 1987, and May 31, 1993, there was an overall conviction rate of 91.1%. Christopher Huber et
al., Environmental Crimes, 33 AM. CIuM. L. REv. 607, 612 (1996).
71 Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 70, at 201.
72 Carn & Thomas, supra note 69, at 92.
73 Downs, supra note 65, at 201. During FY 1997, the EPA referred the largest number of civil and
criminal enforcement cases in its history to the DOJ (426 civil cases and 278 criminal cases) and assessed
more civil and criminal penalties than in any other one-year period in its history ($95.1 million and $169.3
million, respectively). Id.
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States and Japan have broad discretion in deciding whether or not to
prosecute an offender.74 One crucial factor in this decisionmaking process in
both countries is the degree to which the public demands prosecution of
offenders. 5 Public desire for prosecution is often a byproduct of heightened
awareness of a particular crime, which can be prompted in the
environmental context by media coverage of particularly shocking
environmental incidents. 76  The timing of two separate environmental
incidents, one in Japan and the other in the United States, may explain why
the present public desire for prosecution is different in the two countries and
why criminal prosecution is less frequent in Japan today.
In the 1960s and 1970s, there were a number of highly publicized
intentional acts of pollution in both Japan and the United States. In Japan,
most attention was centered on the "Big Four" pollution cases,77 while in the
United States, media attention focused on the Love Canal scandal.78  In the
years following this period of elevated environmental consciousness, neither
country experienced a pollution incident that gripped national public
attention in the same manner as the events of the previous decades. This
changed in 1989, however, when America experienced one of the worst and
most publicized acts of pollution in its history, the Exxon Valdez oil spill in
Prince William Sound, Alaska.79
74 Oda, supra note 11, at 188.
75 See Robert D. Fluharty & Robert E. Lannan, Criminal Liability for Environmental Law Violations
By Coal Operators, 93 W. VA. L. REv. 599, 602 (1991); Castberg, supra note 45.
76 See Steven L. Humphreys, Comment, An Enemy of the People: Prosecuting the Corporate
Polluter as a Common Law Criminal, 39 AM. U. L. Rev. 311, 311-15 (1990).
77 MCKEAN, supra note 2, at 20. The "Big Four" cases include the Niigata and Kumamoto cases
(involving mercury poisoning), the Yokkaichi City case (involving air pollution from oil refineries and
petrochemical and power plants), and the Toyama itai-itai case (involving cadmium poisoning). GRESSER
ET AL., supra note 16, at 29-30.
78 Love Canal was a residential area of Niagara Falls where large quantities of solid and liquid waste
had been buried underground. In 1978, these wastes began to seep into the basements and playrooms of
houses. Roger C. Dower, Hazardous Wastes, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 151,
151 (Paul R. Portney ed., 1990). Two hundred and thirty-seven families had to be permanently evacuated
from their homes. MINTZ, supra note 69, at 33. As Roger Dower notes, "One can almost mark 1978 as the
year when public attention shifted radically toward the view of hazardous waste disposal as a national
environmental problem.... Today, no other environmental problem is more well-publicized or higher on
the public agenda than hazardous wastes. ... Dower, supra, at 151. For more on the publicity
surrounding Love Canal, see Alexa B. Pappas, The Clean AirActAmendments of 1990 Enhanced Criminal
Liability, 3 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 181, 204 n.16 (1992).
79 The T/V Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bligh Reef in Prince William Sound on the evening of
March 23-24, 1989, and spilled approximately II million gallons of North Slope crude oil, making the
Exxon Valdez spill the largest oil spill in U.S. history. The oil spread through Prince William Sound, the
Gulf of Alaska, and lower Cook Inlet, and affected more than 1,200 miles of coastline, including portions
of the Chugach National Forest, Alaska Maritime, Kodiak, Alaska Peninsula/Bechrof National Wildlife
Refuges, Kenai Fjords National Park, Katmai National Park and Preserve, and Aniakchak National
Monument and Preserve. Summary of Injuries to Natural Resources As a Result of the Exxon Valdez Oil
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There is strong evidence that the Exxon Valdez spill was a crucial
event in the development of American public attitudes towards
environmental crime,80 because it generated a renewed sense of public
outrage over pollution. 81 While oil spills often generate a significant amount
of media attention, 82 the facts surrounding the Exxon Valdez spill 83 sparked
particular outrage and "shocking headlines., 84  While many Americans
perceived environmental violations as criminal offenses long before the
spill,85 the Exxon Valdez spill sparked a reawakening of environmental
consciousness and public antagonism towards polluters. 86  The spill served
as a catalyst for the passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, which
strengthened criminal penalties for oil spills. 87  That same year, Congress
also strengthened the criminal provisions of the Clean Air Act.88
Commentators have noted that the criminal prosecution of Exxon was
prompted by the public outcry over the Exxon Valdez spill and have further
suggested that the $125 million criminal fine paid by Exxon was designed to
Spill, 56 FED. REG 14,687, 14,687-88 (1991). As a result of the spill, over 1,000 sea otters and over 36,000
birds, including over 144 bald eagles, died. Id. at 146890-91.
80 A 1991 study showed that 84% of Americans believe that damaging the environment is a serious
crime. Theodore M. Hammett & Joel Epstein, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LOCAL PROSECUTION OF
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME xiii (1993).
81 See Webster J. Arceneaux III, Potential Criminal Liability in the Coal Fields Under the Clean
Water Act: A Defense Perspective, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 691, 706 (1993). The Exxon Valdez spill has also
been deemed the "the largest environmental crime in U.S. history." Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad,
"Crimlorts " As Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 289, 331 (1998).
82 See Jonathon K. Waldron, Oil Spill Legal Issues and Criminal Enforcement, SB43 ALI-ABA 157,
160 (1997), available in WESTLAW, Texts & Periodicals-All Law Reviews, Texts & Bar Journals.
83 The ecological sensitivity of the area, the magnitude of the spill (approximately 11 million
gallons), Exxon's awareness that Captain Joseph Hazelwood had an alcohol problem, and the fact that the
ship's third mate was navigating the ship at the time of the accident all fueled public outrage over the spill.
See Stephen Raucher, Raising the Stakes for Environmental Polluters: The Exxon Valdez Criminal
Prosecution, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 147, 176 (1992); CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 37.
84 Novak & Steese, supra note 66, at 571-72. Such headlines contribute to "increased outrage
against polluters." Id.; see also ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW,
SCIENCE, AND POLICY 138 (1996).
85 In a 1984 survey of 60,000 Americans in which people ranked crimes in order of severity,
environmental crime ranked seventh, above heroin smuggling. Judson W. Starr, Countering Environmental
Crimes, 13 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 379, 380 n.1 (1986) (citing U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN, Jan. 1984).
86 See PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 84, at 3. ("Twenty years after the 1969 Santa Barbara oil spill
galvanized the American environmental movement, the Exxon Valdez joined Chemobyl and Bhopal as
symbols of environmental disasters spawned by the intersection of human carelessness and modem
technology.") Id.
87 See Waldron, supra note 82, at 159.
88 Kevin A. Gaynor et al., Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws, in ENVIRONMENTAL
LITIGATION 215, 215-16 (Janet S. Kole & Larry D. Espel eds., 1st ed. 1998). Conduct which was a
misdemeanor under the pre- 1990 Clean Air Act is now classified as a felony. Id.
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"soothe public outrage, satisfying the perceived need for revenge." 89  In
short, the spill played a significant role in shaping the widespread public
support that now exists for the enforcement of environmental crime laws in
the United States.90
The absence of a high-profile pollution incident in Japan in the 1980s
and early 1990s may explain why the enforcement of environmental crime
laws waned in that country. Relatively minor pollution incidents continued
to occur in Japan throughout the 1980s and 1990s. 9' However, Japan did not
experience an incident analogous to the Exxon Valdez spill until 1997, when
the Russian oil tanker Nakhodka caused the worst oil spill in Japan's history.
A 1989 survey by the United Nations revealed that Japan had the lowest
level of concern and awareness of environmental issues among fourteen
countries surveyed.92 International environmental groups could not attract
members in Japan.93 Prosecutors in Japan did not face the same degree of
public pressure to prosecute environmental crimes as American prosecutors
because there were fewer highly publicized pollution incidents in Japan.
2. Criminal Sanctions Were Rarely Needed to Achieve Regulatory
Compliance in Japan
The second reason why Japan has a substantially smaller
environmental crime program than the United States is that criminal
enforcement has not been as necessary in Japan to ensure that industrial
facilities comply with environmental regulations. Using criminal
enforcement to achieve regulatory compliance was one of the initial
89 Raucher, supra note 83, at 181. The public's desire for prosecution manifested itself in the years
following the spill, when the Department of Justice's perceived failure to prosecute environmental crime
cases became an issue in the 1992 presidential election and even prompted a Congressional investigation.
Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of Environmental Law: Reforming
Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2410 (1995). The Department of Justice was accused of
"letting criminals off the hook" and "letting politics get in the way of prosecutions." Id.
'v Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of Environmental
and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 487 (1996); James M. Strock, Environmental Criminal
Enforcement Priorities for the 1990s, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 916, 919 (1991).
9' For example, the MSA's records indicate that there were a number of marine oil spills throughout
this period, but few if any were significant enough to receive attention in major news accounts: 1987(627
incidents), 1988 (593 incidents), 1989 (605 incidents), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1990), supra note 49, at
362; 1990 (583 incidents), 1991 (527 incidents), 1992 (473 incidents), 1993 (445 incidents), 1994 (373
incidents), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 2 1, at 659.
92 Jonathon Porritt, Open Space: No Campaigning for the Environment Please-We 're Japanese,
DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 26, 1991, at 103.
93 After two years of "intense activity" leading up to 1991, Greenpeace Japan had added only 300
members. The World Wide Fund for Nature had 10,000 members, compared to more than two million in
the United States. There were, however, more than 3,000 grassroots groups with small memberships. Id.
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catalysts for the expansion of the American program. 94 Before 1980, the
United States, like Japan, rarely used criminal prosecution as a means of
enforcing environmental laws.95 Commentators have noted that this was
because the newly formed EPA was still in a "maturing" process of working
out the intricacies of its new regulatory programs.96 Others have noted that
the complexity and technical sophistication inherent in the new laws forced
the EPA to provide a transition period to allow industry and the judicial
system to become acclimated to the new legal regime.97 During these early
years, the EPA relied on civil and administrative enforcement as its primary
enforcement mechanisms.
98
By the early 1980s, however, EPA officials realized that civil
remedies alone were not producing adequate compliance. A significant
number of industry officials simply regarded civil penalties for
environmental violations as a cost of doing business. 99 In order to deter and
punish this mentality, the Department of Justice began to utilize the criminal
provisions of environmental laws that had remained largely dormant
throughout the previous decade. 10°  The primary targets of criminal
prosecution were individuals and corporations that ignored or flouted the
law.' 01 In recent years, prosecutors have expanded this strategy by targeting
"responsible corporate officers," believing that prosecuting individuals has a
stronger deterrent effect than merely prosecuting corporations.102 Unlike
small civil penalties of a few thousand dollars, imprisonment and multi-
94 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5.
95 Id.
96 Id. See also Colleen C. Mumane, Criminal Sanctions for Deterrence Are a Needed Weapon, but
Self-Initiated Auditing Is Even Better: Keeping the Environment Clean and Responsible Corporate Officers
Out of Jail, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1181, 1183 (1994).
97 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5.
98 Id.
99 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5-6. As one commentator noted, "The cost of violating
environmental laws seemed to be a small enough price to pay compared to the cost of compliance." Dick
Thomburgh, Criminal Enforcement of Environmental Laws-A National Priority, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
775, 776 n.3 (1991).
100 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5-6.
101 Id.
102 Under the responsible corporate officer doctrine, an officer may be convicted of knowingly
violating the law even if the officer did not personally carry out the act constituting the violation, provided
that the officer has partial responsibility for the furtherance of the illegal activity and has actual knowledge
of the misconduct. Huber et al., supra note 70, at 616-17 (citing Barry M. Hartman & Charles A. Monaco,
The Present Use of the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in the Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws, 23 ENVTL. L. REP. 10, 145 (1993)).
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million dollar criminal fines cannot simply be absorbed as a cost of doing
business. 103
In contrast to the United States, Japan generally did not need a
criminal enforcement program to ensure regulatory compliance by its
regulated industries. In the United States, where industry and government
often view each other more as adversaries than allies,' 0 4 criminal
enforcement was necessary to prevent pollution by companies that ignored
or flouted environmental laws.' 0 5  Such tactics were not as necessary in
Japan. Commentators have noted that in Japan, industry has a more
cooperative relationship with the government'0 6 and does not oppose
regulation in the same manner as industry in the United States.0 7  The
principal methods of inducing compliance with environmental regulations in
Japan have been discussion, negotiation, and warning. 0 8
Rather than employing coercive measures, Japanese governmental
administrators responsible for ensuring regulatory compliance are known to
prefer a technique called "administrative guidance."' 0 9  Administrators
encourage violators to comply by utilizing the leverage they have to deny
licenses or required permits." 0 While not unique to Japan, administrative
guidance has been particularly successful in Japan,"' and the government
"' CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5-6. The 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act tried to remove
economic incentives to pollute by setting fines at twice the gross pecuniary loss caused by the illegal act, or
twice the gross pecuniary gain to the defendant from his illegal act, whichever is greater. Id. at 3 n.25.
,04 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 280.
105 See CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 5.
106 The contrast between the two nations was noted by a group of state officials from the U.S. Council
of State Governments, which toured Japan in 1988 to learn more about environmental management there.
COUNCIL OF STATE GOV'T, ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN JAPAN: WHAT CAN THE STATES LEARN? 4
(1988). A report summarizing their conclusions noted:
Enforcement of environmental standards is handled in a much less confrontational way. Use of
litigation is considered to be an absolute last resort. Instead, negotiation and consensus building
is the route taken. Their process may take a considerable amount of time, although U.S.
litigation can also be a lengthy process. There appears to be a cultural aversion to litigation that
does not exist here [in the U.S.].
Id.
107 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 280.
' Id. at 260.
109 Shiro Kawashima, A Survey of Environmental Law and Policy in Japan, 20 N.C. J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 231, 257-58 (1995).
"o Id. The only limitation on an agency using administrative guidance is that it cannot violate the
law. Ridgley, supra note 3, at 655.
11 See generally Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally
Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1995). While Japan is not
the only country that utilizes administrative guidance, Japanese bureaucrats are unique in the extent to
which they rely on informal mechanisms to achieve regulatory goals. John 0. Haley, Administrative
Guidance Versus Formal Regulation: Resolving the Paradox of Industrial Policy, in LAW AND TRADE
ISSUES OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 107 (Gary R. Saxonhouse & Kozo Yamamura eds., 1986).
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has been able to persuade industrial facilities to comply with even the
strictest regulations without having to resort to formal legal mechanisms."
2
Administrative guidance, however, generally has focused on achieving
compliance with emission standards, and, as discussed in Part IV, criminal
enforcement is still needed to deter violations by companies that generate or
handle environmentally harmful substances such as petroleum or industrial
waste. 113
The legacy of administrative guidance has been to greatly discourage
the prosecution of environmental crimes in Japan and to inhibit the growth
of Japan's criminal enforcement program. Environmental administrators
believe that administrative guidance is a more effective and flexible tool
than a lengthy criminal trial and are reluctant to refer a pollution case to
criminal prosecutors. 1 4  Because industry also prefers the guidance
approach, officials feel that the chance of achieving compliance is greater
when administrative guidance is used.1 5 Local administrators also fear that
by surrendering a matter to prosecutors, they lose the opportunity to attach
additional conditions that can supplement existing statutory provisions and
regulations. 116  These factors, and the important historical differences
between the regulatory environments of the United States and Japan, have
played a significant role in the different patterns of environmental crime
prosecution in the United States and Japan today.
3. The Integration of Environmental Crime into the Traditional Criminal
Justice System in Japan
One of the most important distinctions between the environmental
crime enforcement programs in the United States and Japan is the degree to
which these programs are integrated into the traditional criminal justice
system of the respective countries. Environmental crime personnel in Japan
consist largely of police who respond to and investigate reported crimes and
local prosecutors who bring criminal charges against violators. 117 These
personnel are more fully integrated into the larger criminal justice system
than their American counterparts." 8 In the United States, the investigation
12 Miller et al., supra note 49, at 20.
"3 See GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 259-61; see infra Part IV.B.
"14 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 26 1.
115 Id.
116 id.
7 Oda, supra note 11, at 187-89.
'18 The National Police Agency has a special section dealing with pollution cases, and the Public
Prosecutor's Office has prosecutors that specialize in pollution cases. Oda, supra note 11, at 187-89. One
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of most pollution crimes is handled by federal authorities and not by local
police. 119 Instead of using police detectives, the federal government has a
specialized group of environmental crime investigators in the EPA's Office
of Criminal Enforcement.12 0  In addition, a significant proportion of
environmental crimes in the United States are prosecuted at the federal level
by the Department of Justice and the ninety-four12' regional United States
Attorney's Offices. 122  These organizational differences help explain the
differing frequency with which environmental crimes are prosecuted in the
United States and Japan.
a. Integration of environmental crime into the traditional criminal
justice system reduces the likelihood that polluters will be
apprehended and leads to a more reactive enforcement program
Japan's decision to integrate the investigation and prosecution of
environmental crime into the traditional criminal justice system has had a
number of impacts, particularly in relation to the apprehension and detection
of criminals. Since environmental officials at Japan's Environment Agency
prefer administrative guidance and rarely refer cases to prosecutors, the
investigation of most environmental crimes in Japan originates with the
police.' 23  Japanese police have the power to investigate pollution-related
offenses on their own initiative, but generally choose not to exercise thispower. 124Instead, usually only after citizen has filed24er nt the police  lyinvestigate l fe iie a ie
a pollution complaint.125 In contrast, the EPA is known to conduct "surprise
searches" of industrial facilities, a tactic that has been described as "a key
weapon in the arsenal" of its criminal enforcement program. 126
commentator noted that these changes were only made "after years of twists and turns in police
organization to control pollution-related crime." Y. Inoue, Police Must Prepare Strategy Ahead of
Nursing-Care Insurance System, DAILY YOMIURI, Jan. 19, 2000, available in 2000 WL 4642108.
As one Department of Justice publication noted, "local criminal enforcement is still in its relative
infancy in the United States .... " Hammett & Epstein, supra note 80, at iii. A few major metropolitan
areas have developed environmental crime programs. Los Angeles County, for example, has an
Environmental Crimes Strike Force with eight full-time investigators. John F. Cooney et al., Criminal
Enforcement of Environmental Laws: Part 1, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10459, 10474 (1995).120 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 8. These investigators are sometimes assisted by the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Id.
121 Theodore L. Garrett, Reinventing EPA Enforcement, 12 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 180, 180
(1998).
122 CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 110-11.
123 Oda, supra note 11, at 189; GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261; see supra Part III.A.2.
124 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261.
125 id.
126 CARR ETAL., supra note 60, at 44.
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Japan's reliance on citizen complaints is a strategy that works very
poorly in the environmental crime context and contributes to the relatively
low number of prosecutions there. 27 One principal consequence of relying
on citizen complaints is that pollution will only be reported when it is
observed by citizens. The result is that pollution that is not visible (e.g.,
groundwater contamination), that cannot be perceived by sight or smell, or
that occurs in remote, unpopulated areas often escapes detection.
Government reports from the 1970s 128 indicate that the police were focusing
on polluters in heavily industrialized areas such as the Seto Inland Sea and
metropolitan cities such as Tokyo. 29  It is highly likely that more
surreptitious acts of pollution in less-populated areas, such as the dumping
of industrial waste in mountainous regions, go unreported. 130  As early as
1979, the Environment Agency noted that "Techniques for eluding
prosecution are becoming increasingly shrewd,"'131 and "[m]uch ingenuity
was employed to conceal" violations. 32  This suggests that a significant
number of environmental crimes in Japan remain undetected or are not
prosecuted.
In the United States, the foundation of the environmental crime
program is at the federal level, with the EPA employing approximately 200
criminal investigators.' 3 3 While a Japanese commentator has remarked that
the police "are often criticized for their failure to enforce the laws
effectively,"' 34 the EPA does not have this type of reputation.' 3 5  Since
12 In 1986, the National Police Agency received 47,905 complaints of "pollution" by citizens. This
figure is grossly misleading, however, because 96.4% of these complaints were for "noise" pollution. Such
a statistic may reveal an inherent problem in the system; noise complaints are placed side-by-side with
complaints about potentially toxic substances. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1987), supra note 26, at 292.
12 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1976), supra note 42, at 220.
129 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1980), supra note 21, at 292-93. In 1982, 30% of Japan's oil pollution
cases involved pollution in the Seto Inland Sea. See Mitsuru Nakayama, Japanese Environmental Laws
and Environmental Rights: Case Study on the Seto Inland Sea, 20 N. KY. L. REV. 113, 128 (1992). Nearly
40% of the industrial complexes in Japan are located in the Seto Inland Sea region. Court Clears Accused
in Sea Contamination Case: Mitsubishi Oil Co., Japan Econ. Newswire, Mar. 9, 1989, available in LEXIS,
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter Court Clears Accused].
130 In September 1999, police raided an Osaka industrial waste disposal business and dozens of other
locations after investigators suspected the company of illegally dumping at least 140 tons of industrial
waste in mountainous areas of western Japan. Osaka Police Raid Firm for Illegal Dumping, MAINICHI
DAILY NEws, Sept. 23, 1999, at 14.
131 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1979), supra note 49, at 258.
132 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1980), supra note 21, at 293.
133 Downs, supra note 65, at 202. In terms of state environmental crime prosecution, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Ohio all have well-established programs. New Jersey alone has 35 investigators devoted
solely to environmental crimes. Cooney et al., supra note 119, at 10474. For an example of a state
environmental crime law, see Gregory A. Zafiris, Limiting Prosecutorial Discretion Under the Oregon
Environmental Crimes Act: A New Solution to an Old Problem, 24 ENVTL. L. 1673 (1994).
'3 Oda, supra note 11, at 189. Oda also notes, "people who suffer from pollution find it difficult to
persuade officials to take necessary actions." Id.
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environmental protection is the primary focus of the EPA, investigators are
able to devote all of their attention to the prevention of environmental crimes
and the apprehension of perpetrators. Enforcement officials in the EPA also
do not have to decide where to best allocate resources (i.e., they do not have
to decide between investigating a homicide and a pollution complaint).
Moreover, EPA regulatory administrators are able to refer cases
directly to investigators within their own governmental agency. This
contrasts with Japan, where administrators must refer them to the police and
prosecutors. 136  Since criminal cases are investigated by the EPA,
administrators are likely less reluctant that local administrators in Japan to
refer a case for prosecution.' 37 In addition, the United States has the added
benefit of a close working relationship between EPA administrators and
investigators. EPA administrators often assist investigators and provide
valuable information on a given industry's personnel and administrative
compliance history.' 38  All of these factors help to explain why criminal
prosecution is more common in the United States than in Japan.
b. Integration 'limits the development of specialized investigatory
expertise that is necessary to gather sufficient evidence for successful
prosecution
The second major consequence of Japan's decision to integrate
environmental crime personnel into the traditional criminal justice system is
that the ability of investigators to gather sufficient evidence for prosecution
is undermined. While environmental crimes and traditional crimes often
share common traits,' 39 successful prosecution generally requires highly
technical scientific expertise different from that required for more traditional
crimes. 1
40
1 Quite the opposite, the EPA's criminal enforcement efforts have been labeled "aggressive."
Cooney et al., supra note 119, at 10465.
6 Richard C. Tallman, How Criminal Investigations Are Conducted, in Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws (Nov. 19, 1991) (CLE International: Civil Penalties and Criminal Enforcement of
Environmental Laws) (on file with the University of Washington Law School Library).
137 GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261.
:39 Tallman, supra note 136.
39 Brickey, supra note 90, at 507-08.
'40 As one commentator noted:
Successful prosecution of environmental crimes hinges on the sound training of investigators
and the teamwork of special agents, attorneys, and technical staff. Investigators and prosecutors
of environmental crimes require a sophisticated understanding of technical statutes . ...
[E]stablishing facts in environmental cases often requires sustained and complex technical
analysis and the cooperation of scientists and regulatory experts over an extended period of time.
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Japanese prosecutors do not like to prosecute pollution crimes because
it is difficult for them to gather sufficient evidence to prove a criminal
violation.14 ' Although the police have strengthened their ability to
investigate pollution violations, police training and technical competence in
the pollution field have been labeled "grossly deficient."'' 42 In many cases
such as those involving air pollution, investigators have had difficulty
gathering sufficient concrete evidence for prosecutors to secure a
conviction. 43 With such a diminished chance of conviction, prosecutors are
less likely to pursue prosecution.
A 1974 case that involved the collapse of a crude oil container at a
Mitsubishi facility on the shores of the Seto.Inland Sea illustrates the
difficulty Japanese investigators have had in gathering evidence for
environmental crimes. 144 More than 43,000 kiloliters of oil were released in
this accident, approximately twenty percent of which reached the Seto
Inland Sea. 45 In 1989, eleven years after the case was first brought to trial,
the Okayama District Court found the defendants not guilty. 146  The judge
held that the cause of the tank's destruction was unclear and concluded there
was no scientific causal relationship between the tank's construction and its
subsequent explosion.147 The judge criticized the investigation, noting that it
failed to sufficiently show why the oil was allowed to flow into the Sea.
48
One of the factors in the success 149 of the American environmental
crime program has been the specialized training and organization of its
Strock, supra note 90, at 927. Another noted, "Environmental law is highly complex. It is fraught with
highly technical scientific, engineering, and economic jargon that, even to one schooled in the intricacies of
environmental science and economics, can be truly mind-boggling." Brickey, supra note 90, at 501.
4' GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261.
142 Id.
141 Id. at 469 n.212.
1I d.
'45 This was the largest accident of its kind in Japan at the time, and resulted in 16.8 billion yen in
losses to regional fishing industries and 53.6 billion in cleanup costs. Court Clears Accused, supra note
129.
146 Id. The Public Prosecutor's Office did not indict Mitsubishi because it assumed that the defendant
could not foresee or prevent the accident (which occurred shortly after the completion of the tank) and
because the company had neither dumped oil into a public sea nor violated statutory regulations. GRESSER
ET AL., supra note 16, at 469 n.212. Only the contractors for the tank were indicted for negligence based on
the theory that the contractors failed to strengthen the foundation, which caused subsidence of the ground
and ultimately deformed and ruptured the tank. Court Clears Accused, supra note 129. In his decision,
however, the judge did mention Mitsubishi's culpability, noting that the company failed to take efforts to
prevent the oil from flowing into the water until the next moming. Id.
147 Id.
'48 Id.; see also GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 469 n.212.
149 In 1991, there was a 99% likelihood that once criminal charges were filed, at least one defendant
in a U.S. federal environmental case would be convicted, whether by plea or a guilty verdict. Strock, supra
note 90, at 919.
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investigators. 150  EPA investigators receive specialized training at the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center15' and are provided technical and
litigation support from the National Enforcement Investigations Center
("NEIC").52  American investigators have the added benefit of extensive
"on-the-job" training, which is obtained by working in the same offices as
regulatory administrators at EPA regional offices. 53  Unlike Japanese
police, who work in an organization in which environmental matters
constitute only a small portion of the work, EPA investigators work in the
same offices as regulators who are dedicated exclusively to the
administration and enforcement of environmental law. These organizational
differences help explain why environmental crime prosecution has been
more prevalent in the United States than in Japan.
4. American Prosecutors Have the Benefit of Favorable Environmental
Crime Case Law, While in Japan There Have Been Few
Environmental Crime Cases
One final factor that may explain why criminal prosecution for
environmental violations is less common in Japan is the role of the judicial
system. Like prosecutors in the United States, Japanese prosecutors have
broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute an offender. 54
Prosecutors in both countries are undoubtedly influenced by the likelihood
of obtaining a conviction, which in turn is influenced by legal precedent.155
ISO'Environmental crime investigators need "a knowledge of the law, public health and science."
Craig W. Anderson, Environmental Enforcement, 9 UTAH B.J. 23, 25 (1996). Investigators at the National
Enforcement Training Institute ("NETI") can receive training in general criminal investigation and more
specialized skills such as using ultraviolet remote air pollution monitoring equipment, testing emissions
from wastewater sources in the synthetic organic chemical industry, using proper sampling techniques,
investigating refineries, and sampling solid hazardous wastes. See NETI, NETI Course Catalog and
Schedule (visited May 2, 2000) <http://es.epa.gov/oeca/oceft/neti/catalog_2000/NETlcatalog2.html>.
151 Strock, supra note 90, at 927-28. State, federal, and local personnel are also trained at the NETI,
which was established pursuant to the Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990. CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at
10.
152 Id. at 8. The National Enforcement Investigations Center is located in Denver, Colorado and is
staffed by more than 60 trained environmental crime investigators. The exclusive mission of the NEIC is
to "uncover, obtain, and present evidence of criminal environmental violations and related crimes."
Anderson, supra note 150, at 25.
153 Id.
154 Oda, supra note 11, at 188.
155 See Lynda J. Oswald, Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney General's Discretion
in Immigration Matters, 85 MICH. L. REV. 152, 173 (1986) ("A number of other factors may influence the
prosecutor's decision to charge, including . . . the perceived likelihood of conviction.") (citing United
States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir.
1978)); Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L.
REV. 1, 11 (1971); Pugach v. Klein, 193 F. Supp. 630, 634-35 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
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American prosecutors have the benefit of relatively favorable legal
precedent in the area of environmental crime, which helps explain why the
prosecution of environmental crimes has been more common in the United
States.156 American courts have decided dozens of important environmental
crime cases over the past thirty years and have been receptive to progressive
criminal liability theories such as the "responsible corporate officer"
doctrine. 157 Courts have also liberally construed statutes such as the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") in a manner that does not require prosecutors to prove
that violators actually knew that their actions violated the law. 158
In an important case decided last year, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an individual can be held criminally liable for a violation
of the CWA that is caused by "ordinary negligence" rather than by "criminal
negligence," which is more difficult to prove.159 Commentators have noted
that this decision "will likely draw the attention of criminal prosecutors and
may lead to more aggressive enforcement actions."' 160 With the help of such
favorable case law, the Department of Justice's Environmental Crimes
Section has achieved an overall conviction rate as high as ninety-five
percent. 16' The high conviction rate in turn encourages prosecutors to
prosecute future cases.
In contrast, there have only been two landmark environmental crime
cases in Japan, both of which were decided by the Japanese Supreme Court
in 1988 after nearly a decade of litigation. The first case involved the Chisso
Corporation, a company that gained international notoriety for its discharge
of methyl mercury-contaminated wastewater into Minimata Bay.' 62  The
156 See Joshua D. Yount, The Rule of Lenity and Environmental Crime, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 607,
610 (1997).
117 This doctrine allows the government to hold a corporate officer criminally liable for public welfare
offenses, regardless of his or her participation, as long as he or she is in a position of power to prevent and
correct the violation. See Gaynor et al., supra note 88, at 222-25.158 See Christine L. Wettach, Mens Rea and the "Heightened Criminal Liability" Imposed on
Violators of the Clean Water Act, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 377, 384-87 (1996) (discussing United States v.
Weitzenhoff, I F.3d 1523 (9th Cir.), reh "g denied and amended, 35 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1993)).
'59 United States v. Hanousek, 176 F.3d 1116 (9th Cir. 1999). Hanousek sought a jury instruction
that would require the jury to find criminal negligence, "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a
reasonable person would observe in the situation." Id. at 1120 (quoting the American Law Institute's
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (1985)). The court, however, instructed the jury that the government was
required to prove only that the defendant acted negligently, which it defined as failing "to use reasonable
care." Id.
160 Kurt Weissmuller, 9th Cir. Holds Project Manager Criminally Liable Under CWA, 15 ENVTL.
COMPLIANCE & LITIG. STRATEGY 4 (1999).
161 Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 70, at 201. Between October 1, 1987 and May 31, 1993, there was
an overall conviction rate of 91.1%. Christopher Huber et al., Environmental Crimes, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 607, 612 (1996).
162 For more on the facts and procedural history of this case, see Frank Upham, Japan v. Kawamoto:
Judicial Limits on the State's Power to Indict, 13 LAW IN JAPAN 137 (1980).
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mercury found its way into the food chain and concentrated in human brain
tissue, causing the dreaded "Minimata disease.' 63  A lower court found the
president of the company and the factory manager guilty of negligently
causing the deaths of seven people. 164 In 1988, the Japanese Supreme Court
affirmed the lower court ruling.165 Although this was the first time that the
Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction of a top corporate official in a
pollution case, the case has limited value as precedent because it was
prosecuted under the Criminal Code and not under an environmental crime
law. 166
In 1988, the Supreme Court reviewed a second environmental crime
case involving the Nippon Aerosol Company.167 In 1974, an apprentice tank
truck driver connected a pipe incorrectly, causing a discharge of chlorine gas
into the air.168  The discharge caused numerous health problems in the
surrounding community. 169  The apprentice, his colleague, his supervisor,
and the head of the production department were prosecuted for violations of
the Environmental Pollution Crime Law 170 and, in 1979, a lower court found
all four employees guilty. 17' The head of the department and the supervisor
were found negligent because they allowed an inexperienced apprentice to
handle the pipe without adequate training. 72 The court ordered the company
163 Id. at 137; Lower Court Rulings on "Minimata Disease" Case Upheld, JIl PRESS TICKER
SERVICE, Mar. 1, 1988, available in LEXIS, Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter Minimata
Disease]. This case was the only one of the "Big Four" pollution cases that resulted in criminal sanctions.
Oda, supra note 11, at 187. Symptoms of Minimata disease included "concentric constriction of the visual
field, poor motor coordination, disturbances in seulsation, loss of speech or hearing, tremors, and
convulsions in the limbs." MCKEAN, supra note 2, at 50. The disease can strike and kill in a matter of
weeks and causes birth defects in children. Id. at 50-51. By 1979, it was estimated that there were 10,000
Minimata victims. Id. at 57.
164 Oda, supra note 11, at 187. When the case was appealed, the appellate court upheld the judgment
of the district court. Id.
165 Id.
'6 Id. at 187.
167 Id. at 188-89.
68 Two employees accidentally opened the wrong valve after liquid chlorine in a reserve tank had
accumulated, and the liquid chlorine turned to gas and flowed out. Court Finds Chemical Firm Innocent,
Employees Punished; Nippon Aerosol Co., Japan Econ. Newswire, Oct. 27, 1988, available in LEXIS,
Asia/Pacific Rim Archive News [hereinafter Nippon Aerosol Co.].
169 One hundred and twenty-six inhabitants experienced dermatitis, and 44 citizens living near the
factory suffered from acute laryngitis. Oda, supra note 11, at 188-89. In Yokkaichi, the eyes and throats of
more than 10,000 residents were affected. Nippon Aerosol Co., supra note 168.
76 Id. at 188. The prosecutor in the case, Katsuhiko "The Bear" Kamazuki, has recently gained
celebrity status in Japan for his prosecution of corruption in Japan's Finance Ministry. See Kazuhiro
Shimamura & David Williams, Japan Scandal Bear, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Mar. 8, 1998, available in
LEXIS, World News Database, Bus. Anal. & Country Info and Selected Legal Texts and Codes File.
171 Oda, supra note 11, at 188 (citing Judgment of the Tsu District Court, Mar. 7, 1979. Nagoya
Appellate Court, Jan. 24, 1984 (Japan Aerosol Case)).
172 Id. at 188.
ENVIRONMENTAL CRIME IN JAPAN
to pay a fine equivalent to $10,000 and the employees were given four-
month suspended sentences. 173  In 1988, however, the Supreme Court
reviewed the case and reversed the conviction of the company, holding that
the discharge was an accident and that there were limits on how far the law
could be applied in accident cases.' 74 While it is difficult to gauge the effect
of these two cases on the enforcement of environmental laws in Japan, it is
apparent that Japanese prosecutors do not have the benefit of favorable case
law enjoyed by American prosecutors. This is another factor that may
explain why prosecution is less common in Japan than in the United
States. 175
In summary, there are a number of possible explanations for Japan's
reluctance to prosecute polluters as frequently as the United States. These
include the different chronologies of major pollution events in Japan and the
Unitkd States and the different regulatory environments, organizational
frameworks for enforcement personnel, and case law of the two countries.
As Japan looks to its future, it must decide whether the current level of
criminal enforcement provides sufficient deterrence for intentional and
reckless acts of pollution.
IV. WHILE ADMINISTRATIVE GUIDANCE HAS REDUCED INDUSTRIAL
POLLUTION, A STRONG CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM Is NEEDED
IN JAPAN TO DETER "MIDNIGHT DUMPING" AND OIL SPILLS
Japan's traditional reliance on non-criminal administrative guidance
has been very successful in controlling pollution from large industrial
facilities over the past several decades. 176  Many Japanese industries have
17' GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, 261 n.21 1.
174 Nippon Aerosol Co., supra note 168. The decision did include some favorable holdings. The
court affirmed the lower court convictions of the four employees, four-months in prison and two years of
probation. Id. The court also found that persons can be held liable under the law even if the discharge is
the outflow of waste carried out as part of a factory's normal operations. Id. The court also held that
supervisors can be held criminally liable for negligent acts of employees. Id.
175 Commentators have noted that corporate managers in Japan are often acquitted in environmental
crime trials. An example is the 1973 Morinaga Milk Case, which involved the contamination of dry milk
by inorganic mercury and caused a number of infants to die or become sick. Oda, supra note 11, at 195.
Ryuichi Hirano, Comment, Penal Law Protection of the Natural Environment in Japan, 13 LAW IN JAPAN
129, 132 (1980). While the head of the production section was found guilty of negligent homicide and
negligent bodily injury, the manager of the plant was acquitted. Id. A similar result was reached in a case
involving the death and injury of a number of people from polychlorinated biphenyl ("PCB")
contamination of rice bran oil. Id. at 132-33. The plant manager was convicted, but the president of the
company was merely discharged. Id.
176 As Maurice Strong, former United Nations Under Secretary-General and Chair of the 1992 Rio
Earth Summit, noted, "More than any other nation, Japan has reduced its levels of air and water pollution
and the amount of energy and raw materials it uses to produce a unit of gross domestic product." Maurice
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responded positively to the "carrot" of economic and regulatory incentives
to reduce pollution, and have not had to face the "stick" of criminal
enforcement. 177  Pollution, however, has many sources. There are at least
two other types of pollution in Japan that administrative guidance has not
prevented and for which strong criminal enforcement is needed. The first is
illegal industrial waste disposal.1 78 This problem stems from the presence of
thousands of industrial facilities in Japan, many of which find it cheaper to
dump waste illegally than to pay for the cost of proper disposal at designated
facilities (often referred to as "midnight dumping"). 179  The second type is
oil spills, which are a particularly serious threat in Japan due to its island
geography and heavy dependence on foreign petroleum.'
80
A. The Dumping ofIndustrial Waste
The first type of pollution that Japan must aggressively prosecute is
the illegal dumping of industrial waste. The dumping of industrial waste'
81
has been one of the areas of greatest noncompliance with Japanese
environmental crime laws.' 82  Every year, Japanese factories generate
Strong, Energy, the Environment, and Global Economic Growth, 2 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 121, 123-24
(1994).
177 Ridgley, supra note 3, at 655 ("The Japanese administrator, rather than using the 'stick' of
enforcement, achieves most regulatory goals through social pressure and/or 'carrots' e.g., financial
incentives which reward compliance."). See also GRESSER ET AL., supra note 16, at 261 ("For the Western
observer, one of the most striking aspects of the Japanese administration's approach to enforcement surely
must be the apparent reliance on negotiation and guidance... [p]erhaps even more striking is the absence
of criminal prosecutions for violations of pollution laws.").
s78 See Frank Gibney Jr., Taking on the Trash Concerns over a Planned Dump Site Have Energized
Japan's Citizens to Lead a Rare Fight Against the System, TIME, June 16, 1997, at 22 ("[T]he public outcry
over waste disposal is building across Japan."). Some officials have even been paid bribes to permit
industrial waste disposal. In May 1998, a prefectural official at the Wakayama Prefectural Health and
Pollution Research Center was arrested on suspicion of taking at least 2.1 million yen in return for lobbying
for approval to operate a waste incinerator. Wakayama Offlicial Nabbed for Bribery, MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS, May 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 10974517. Local residents suffered from various ailments
caused by air pollution generated by the incinerator, and high levels of dioxin were detected in the
incinerator's ashes. Id. The facility closed in 1995, but waste and ashes were abandoned at the site. Id.
179 See CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 114; David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a
Triangular Federal System: Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the
United States, the States, and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1654 (1995).
' In 1973, 76% of Japan's primary energy came from oil and virtually 100% of it was imported. A.
Radha Krishnan & Malcolm Tull, Resource and Environmental Management in Japan, 1890-1990, AusT.
ECON. HIST. REV., Sept. 1994, at 3, 17 (1994).
1s Most illegally disposed industrial waste is construction waste (83.6%), followed by sludge (8.9%),
and waste plastic (4.6%). ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 709. Most waste is dumped in
the mountains, forests, and wilderness (60.8%), followed by roads and vacant lots (9.9%), rice paddies and
farms (1.4%), and landfills and land cleared for housing sites (1.3%). Id.
182 See supra note 53 and accompanying text. The most egregious case of illegal industrial waste
dumping in Japan took place on the island of Teshima, where 500,000 tons of industrial waste containing
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approximately 397 million tons of waste sludge and metal slag, which has
been associated with water pollution with alarming levels of mercury,
cadmium, and lead. 183 Approximately eighty percent of all illegal disposal
violations are committed by the company that generates the waste,' 8 4 with
the remaining violations committed by companies that hire uncertified
operators to transport and dispose of their waste.' 85  Many of these
uncertified operators charge lower fees than certified operators, a practice
that is often linked to illegal dumping.' 86 Illegal dumpers in Japan have been
known to rent property with the promise of filling it with soil, when in fact
they later fill it with industrial waste. 187  It is increasingly difficult for
companies in Japan to find treatment sites that will accept industrial
waste.' 88 Officials at the Environment Agency predict that illegal dumping
will continue to increase over the next few years.
89
While the cooperative nature of administrative guidance can help
persuade a financially successful company to comply with its emission
permit or install new pollution control technology, it has less utility in the
industrial waste context. Many companies in Japan are only marginally
profitable and are at risk of bankruptcy. 90 With high costs for proper waste
disposal or treatment, these companies face an ever-present temptation to
illegally dump their waste or pay others to do so. 19' Japanese gangs called
"yakuza"'192 and sophisticated international organized crime syndicates have
become increasingly involved in illegal waste disposal. 193 By responding to
toxic substances were dumped. Shiro Matsui & Satoshi Nogami, Illegal Trash Finds New Home: Kagawa
Township to Take on 500,000 Tons of Waste, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Mar. 24, 2000, available in 2000 WL
6945576.
183 Gibney, supra note 178.
'" ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 276.
185 Id. The Waste Disposal Law punishes the illegal consignment of waste and the operation of a
disposal business without a license. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 708.
186 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 276.
187 Id.
188 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 672.
189 Tenfold Increase in Illegal Dumping Fines Planned for Waste Disposal Law Amendments, 19
INT'L ENV'T REP. 569 (1996) [hereinafter Tenfold Increase].
'90 As one commentator noted, "Japan's industrial environment is one of the world's most
competitive .... As a result ... the bankruptcy rate in Japan is one of the world's highest." Jay Dratler,
Jr., Trade Secrets in the United States and Japan: A Comparison and Prognosis, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 68,
110. See also id. at 110 n.184 (noting that there are 18,000 business bankruptcies per year in Japan).
191 More than half of all Waste Disposal Law violations have been attributed to efforts to cut costs on
treatment. ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1984), supra note 43, at 276.
192 Japan Aims to Clean up Gang-Ridden Garbage Business, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Mar. 10,
2000, available in 2000 WL 2750062.
193 Dumpers to Be Charged, supra note 5. News reports have noted that many waste management
operators are predominantly run by yakuza, which illegally dispose of waste on behalf of corporations in
exchange for large fees. Amendments to Waste Disposal Law Foresees Higher Penalties, Stricter EIA
Requirements, 20 INT'L ENV'T REP. 383 (1997) [hereinafter Amendments to Waste Disposal Law]. In May
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this growing pollution epidemic with criminal prosecution, Japan can
provide the strong deterrence that is needed to prevent companies from
succumbing to the temptation of illegally dumping their waste.
B. Oil Spills
A strong criminal enforcement program is also needed in Japan to
help deter large oil spills. Although Japan has experienced a steady decrease
in the number of oil spills, 194 it still experiences almost 400 oil spills
annually.' 95 More importantly, a significant proportion of Japan's oil spills
are preventable. In 1994, for example, 121 incidents were the result of
careless handling and seventy-nine were intentional. 196
The risk of oil spills is particularly high in Japan because many large
oil tankers and other vessels pass through its waters. 197  In 1997, Japan
experienced one of its worst oil spills ever. 198  The Russian oil tanker
Nakhodka broke apart in stormy seas off the Oki Islands and spilled at least
five million liters' 99 of fuel oil into the sea.200  The spill polluted more than
1997, environmental leaders from the United States, Canada, Italy, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the European Union met to coordinate efforts to fight international environmental
crime. Earl E. Devaney & Michael J. Penders, Recent Developments in International Cooperation and the
Environmental Leaders Summit, 13 NAAG NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J. 3 (1997). EPA Administrator
Carol Browner sought improved cooperation between enforcement agencies to facilitate successful
investigation. In March 2000, the Japanese Health and Welfare Ministry drew up a bill in response to the
growing yakuza involvement in industrial waste after the National Police Agency requested that it take a
"tougher stance" on the problem. Gov't to Dump on Waste Firm Gangs, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Mar. 11,
2000, available in 2000 WL 6945349.
'9' The MSA's records indicate a steady decrease in the number of oil spill incidents from 1973 to
1994: 1973 (2,060 incidents), 1974 (1,985 incidents), 1975 (1,584 incidents), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
(1976), supra note 49, at 158; 1976 (1,501 incidents), 1977 (1,339 incidents), 1978 (1,079 incidents),
ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1979), supra note 49, at 166; 1987 (627 incidents), 1988 (593 incidents), 1989
(605 incidents), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1990), supra note 49, at 362; 1990 (583 incidents), 1991 (527
incidents), 1992 (473 incidents), 1993 (445 incidents), 1994 (373 incidents), ENVIRONMENT AGENCY
(1995), supra note 21, at 358.
195 In 1998, there were 389 oil spills and 285 spills of other substances. Marine Pollution Incidents at
Lowest Level Since 1973, Japan Econ. Newswire, Jan. 13, 1999, available in 1999 WL 9626913.
96 ENVIRONMENT AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 658. Intentional discharges are usually related
to ballasting. After tankers discharge their cargo at a port, they ride high in the water, which causes
stability problems. Jeff B. Curtis, Comment, Vessel-Source Oil Pollution and MARPOL 73/78: An
International Success Story?, 15 ENVTL. L. 679, 682-83 (1985). In response, seawater is taken in as
ballast, which mixes with oil residues and is released when the ballast is later discharged. Id.
197 In total, 99.8% of all natural resources and foodstuffs imported by Japan enter the country by sea.
Marcus Hand, Do More for Straits Safety, Japan Urges User Nations, Bus. TIMES (Singapore), Jan. 28,
1999, available in 1999 WL 8239680. See also supra note 180.
198 Swift Cleanup Action, Favorable Weather Control Supertanker's Spill in Tokyo Bay, 20 INT'L
ENV'T REP. 668.
199 Five million liters is 1.3 million gallons.
200 Japan/Science: Oil Spill Redress Stuck in Sludge, ASAHI SHINBUN, Feb. 20, 1998, available in
1998 WL 7720260.
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310 miles of coastline and affected fish stocks, shellfish farms, scenic areas,
and bird sanctuaries. 20 1 The deaths of five volunteers involved in the spill
clean-up intensified public outrage over the environmental damage.20 2
While the Nakhodka spill was extraordinary in size, it was not the last
of Japan's encounters with highly publicized, preventable oil spills. Only
six months after the spill, the supertanker Diamond Grace scraped the
seabed in Tokyo Bay and spilled an estimated 400,000 gallons of crude
oil.203  Maritime police decided to send the case up for prosecution after
investigators discovered that the captain had falsely reported that he slowed
the vessel through a shallow part of Tokyo Bay. 204 In September 1998, a
tanker collided with a fishing vessel and spilled 70,000 gallons of fuel oil off
the Port of Esashi near Hokkaido Island.20 5  Japanese officials stated that
they believed the accident was caused by the failure of crewmembers on
both vessels to keep watch.20 6 The reoccurrence of preventable oil spills
suggests that the current enforcement scheme does not serve as an adequate
deterrent for negligent behavior on the part of oil shippers.20 7
While there is substantial support for the prosecution of intentional
"midnight dumpers" of industrial waste,20 8 some critics feel that criminal
201 Edwin Unsworth, Japanese Oil Spill Claims Expected, BUS. INS., Feb. 24, 1997, at 18, available
in 1997 WL 8293916.
202 Kyodo News Summary, Japanese Econ. Newswire, Feb. 4, 1997, at 2, available in LEXIS, World
News Database, Bus. Anal. & Country Info and Selected Legal Texts and Codes File. Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto's cabinet awarded one million yen to each volunteer posthumously. Id. One man died
of a heart attack, and the others are presumed to have died of overwork, exposure to the cold, and the
inhalation of toxic fumes from the oil. Volunteer Becomes 5th to Die After Joining Oil Cleanup, DAILY
YOMIURI, Feb. 5, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7072859; Sonni Efron, Japanese Effort to Clean Up Oil Spill
Hits Rough Seas, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1997, at A-I. The youngest victim was 53 and the oldest was 77.
Gov't Pays I Mil. Yen Damages for Oil Cleanup Deaths, Japanese Econ. Newswire, Feb. 14, 1997,
available in LEXIS, World News Database, Bus. Anal. & Country Info and Selected Legal Texts and
Codes File.
203 Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay Under Control, Japanese Econ. Newswire, July 4, 1997, available in
LEXIS, World News Database, Bus. Anal. & Country Info and Selected Legal Texts and Codes File;
MEPC Delays Decision on Quick Single-Hull Tanker Phase-Out, OIL SPILL INTELLIGENCE REPORT, Sept.
25, 1997, at 1.
204 Oil Spill in Tokyo Bay Under Control, supra note 203.
205 World Spill Briefs, OIL POLLUTION BULL., Sept. 18, 1998, at 7.
206 id.
207 Some people in Japan feel there is a lack of adequate deterrence, a fact supported by a Japanese
news headline that proclaimed, "H.K. Skipper Gets Hand Slapped for Oil Spill." H.K. Skipper Gets Hand
Slapped for Oil Spill, Japanese Econ. Newswire, Feb. 16, 1990, available in LEXIS, Asia/Pacific Rim
Archive News. This case involved a Hong Kong skipper of a Liberian-flagged cargo ship that ran aground
and spilled more than 500 tons of crude oil off the Tango Peninsula northwest of Kyoto. Id. The skipper
was ordered to pay a 200,000 yen fine. Id. Prosecutors refused to charge the skipper under the Marine
Contamination Prevention Law because they believed the crew did everything possible to seal off the ship's
oil tanks to stop leakage before it abandoned the ship. Id. The Kyoto prefectural office estimated that
fisheries suffered damages of 180 million yen. 1d.
208 See Carr & Thomas, supra note 69, at 95.
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prosecution is inappropriate for oils spills, which are often unintentional and
characterized as "accidents." 20 9  Other commentators 210 and courts2 11 have
noted that criminal prosecution is equally valuable and justified212 in
unintentional cases of pollution because it provides a powerful incentive to
potential polluters to take preventative measures. 1 3  In light of the
widespread and long-term environmental damage that can result from large
spills, strong criminal enforcement must be in place in Japan to deter and
prevent future spills.
214
C. A Strengthened Criminal Enforcement Program Will Reduce Illegal
Dumping and the Number of Oil Spills in Japan
While the need for deterrence in Japan is clear,21 5 there is still
substantial debate as to whether criminal enforcement deters intentional and
negligent acts of pollution. Nowhere has the issue of deterrence been
debated more fiercely than in the United States, one of the world's leading
nations in environmental crime prosecution.2t 6 One of the main criticisms of
209 See Sharona Hoffman, Criminal Sanctions in Accidental Oil Spill Cases-Punishment Without a
Crime, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1033, 1038, 1040 (1992); Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 342-43 (1996).210 Humphreys, supra note 76, at 352-53. For a legal and economic analysis on the prevention of oil
spills, see Kevin E. Lunday & Stephen J. Darmody, Using Financial Markets to Protect the Environment:
U.S. Coast Guard Leads Modern Approach, 10 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 173 (1998).
211 For example, in reviewing the criminal prosecution of Joseph Hazelwood, captain of the Exxon
Valdez, the Supreme Court of Alaska noted the following:
[T]he threat of punishment for objective fault will deter people from conducting themselves in
such a way as to create risk to others .... [lit cannot be disputed that the threat of punishment
necessarily deters. Even when an offender does not of his own accord realize that his conduct is
wrongful, he can in many cases be made to take care.
State v. Hazelwood, 946 P.2d 875, 883-84 (Alaska 1997).212 See Leslie Yalof Garfield, A More Principled Approach to Criminalizing Negligence: A
Prescription for the Legislature, 65 TENN. L. REV. 875, 910 (1998).21 See Michelle Cuttler, Incentives for Reducing Oil Pollution from Ships: The Case for Enhanced
Port State Control, 8 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 175, 175 n.4 (1995) (citing SAFER SHIPS, CLEANER SEAS,
THE REPORT OF LORD DONALDSON'S INQUIRY INTO THE PREVENTION OF POLLUTION FROM MERCHANT
SHIPPING, PRESENTED TO PARLIAMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR TRANSPORT 141 (1994)).
214 See Mark T. Peterson, Comment, State Incentive Based Oil Tanker Regulation: An Alternative to
Traditional Command-and-Control Regulation, 4 OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 271, 308 (1999) ("Preventing oil
from being discharged into the marine environment is undoubtedly the best oil spill strategy.").
2'5 While deterrence has been called "the primary goal of environmental law," some commentators
have noted that environmental crime prosecution serves other purposes such as moral retribution. Novak &
Steese, supra note 66, at 573 n. 18; Humphreys, supra note 76, at 354.
216 Richard J. Lazarus, Assimilating Environmental Protection into Legal Rules and the Problem with
Environmental Crime, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 867, 883 (1994) (discussing some of the debate); Carr &
Thomas, supra note 69, at 93 ("The criminalization of environmental law is primarily an American
phenomena.").
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environmental crime prosecution is that civil liability provides a sufficient
deterrence and criminal laws "overdeter." 217  Violators are sometimes
punished with criminal fines that are imposed in addition to harsh civil
penalties. Critics claim that double sanctions simply invite expensive and
duplicative litigation costs without necessarily enhancing environmental
protection. 2 8 Others argue that the overuse of criminal prosecution devalues
its public stigma deterrent effect2 19 and suggest that it should only be used
sparingly.220  Still others note that criminal prosecution does not lead to
optimal deterrence because prosecutors are often accused of choosing cases
arbitrarily221 based largely on political motivations.
222
It is difficult to assess the merit of these arguments or to gauge
precisely the effectiveness of criminal enforcement since it is only one part
of an environmental regulatory regime.223 However, many commentators, as
well as the EPA and the U.S. Congress, believe that criminal enforcement
224has played a very important role in deterring pollution. There is anecdotal
evidence that criminal enforcement in the United States has had a deterrent
217 See Christopher H. Shroeder, Cool Analysis Versus Moral Outrage in the Development of Federal
Environmental Criminal Law, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 251 (1993); Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1039
("Criminal prosecutions of environmental accidents serve neither the purpose of deterrence nor the purpose
of removing dangerous elements from society. Severe deterrence already is built into the extensive civil
regulatory scheme that governs environmental abuses.").
218 Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1039.
219 See Stuart P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the
Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533, 1536 n.4 (1997) ("[Criminal law] should only
be used to prohibit conduct to which the moral opprobrium of the community attaches .... The use of the
criminal law in . . . borderline areas serves to devalue its significance in relation to the traditional
'crimes."') (quoting GENEVRA RICHARDSON ET AL., POLICING POLLUTION: A STUDY OF REGULATION AND
ENFORCEMENT 14-15 (1982)); John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on
the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 200-01 (1991).
220 See Lazarus, supra note 216, at 883. Steve Herman, the EPA's Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance, has insisted that the EPA is "targeting actions carefully," and concentrating
its efforts on "the most serious pollutants and the greatest risks." Downs, supra note 65, at 201.
221 See Lazarus, supra note 89, at 2454 (quoting WILLIAM J. CORCORAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES PROGRAM 83, 128 (1994)).
222 Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1047.
223 For an excellent attempt at empirical analysis of the deterrent value of environmental crime
enforcement, see Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and
Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1054 (1992). See also Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental
Monitoring and Enforcement, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 1245 (2000).
224 See Ethan H. Jessup, Environmental Crimes and Corporate Liability: The Evolution of the
Prosecution of "Green " Crimes by Corporate Entities, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 721, 725 (1999). The EPA
has noted that criminal enforcement is "perhaps our most powerful environmental enforcement sanction
and creates the strongest deterrence." David L. Markell, The Role of Deterrence-Based Enforcement in a
"Reinvented" State/Federal Relationship: The Divide Between Theory and Reality, 24 HARv. ENVTL. L.
REv. 1, 9 n.29 (2000) (citing U.S. EPA, CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT ADDENDUM TO THE POLICY
FRAMEWORK FOR STATE/EPA ENFORCEMENT AGREEMENTS I (1993)); Helen M. Maher, Attempting to
Legislate Attempted Environmental Crimes, 15 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 735, 767 & n.259 (1998).
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effect on polluters. For example, since the passage of the Oil Pollution Act
of 1990, which contains criminal enforcement provisions, the total volume
of oil spilled in the United States has declined sharply.225 While there are a
number of possible explanations for this trend, commentators and
government officials insist that criminal prosecution has played a critical
role.226
By increasing the frequency with which environmental crime is
prosecuted, Japan can improve the deterrence of intentional dumping and
pollution caused by negligence. Criminal prosecution provides an obvious
deterrent in the threat of incarceration. 7  Prison sentences for
environmental crimes have been imposed much less frequently in Japan than
in the United States.228  Imprisonment may not be necessary in all
environmental crime prosecutions in Japan because of the strong deterrent
role of the public stigma that is associated with criminal prosecution ("public
stigma deterrence").229 However, public stigma deterrence has been largely
225 API Reports Sharp Increase in U.S. Spillage During 1996, OIL POLLUTION BULL., June 5, 1998, at
2. The annual average quantity of oil spilled from freighters, barges, and tankers in U.S. waters between
1987 and 1991 was 5.94 million gallons of oil, compared to an annual average of 1.14 gallons between
1992 and 1996, a decrease of 81%. Id. Tanker spills declined even more dramatically, from an annual
average of 4 million gallons between 1987 and 1991, to an average of 160,000 gallons between 1992 and
1996, a 96% decrease. Id.
226 While the Coast Guard has stated that criminal sanctions are "only a small part" of the agency's
enforcement program (only 10 cases out of 8,357 were under investigation as potential criminal cases),
officials insist they are essential because "anecdotal evidence suggests that, for some violators, this is the
only effective deterrent." House Subcommittee Urged to Ease Criminal Liability for U.S. Spills, OIL
POLLUTION BULL., June 5, 1998, at 1, 5. See also Strock, supra note 90, at 916.
227 See Jonathon P. Guy, The Criminalization of Environmental Law in the United States: Is There
Any Better Way to Alienate the Regulated Community?, in STRATEGIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT 113, 143 (1995) ("[T]he threat of imprisonment has undoubtedly deterred corporate
officials from violating environmental laws .... "). Criminal prosecution has also been praised for its
ability to achieve resolution more rapidly than civil litigation. Pappas, supra note 78, at 186 (noting that
civil cases can take years to file and complete, while criminal convictions can be acquired within a one year
period).
228 In 1974, 233 persons were convicted of violating the Air Pollution Control Law. Id. Only five
were punished by imprisonment. Id. In 1973, 113 were convicted of violating the Water Pollution Control
Law, but only one person was sentenced to prison. Hirano, supra note 175, at 135. In contrast,
approximately 55% of those convicted of environmental crimes in the United States in 1990 were
sentenced to prison. Pappas, supra note 78, at 187. Americans tend to favor prison sentences as
punishment for polluters. In 1990, a telephone survey of 1,004 U.S. households asked callers if they would
favor or oppose changing environmental crime laws so that when companies are found guilty of
deliberately violating pollution laws, the officials responsible could be sentenced to jail terms. Id. at 185
n. 17 (citing Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 889, 889 n.1 (1991)). Seventy-two percent of those polled favored such changes. Id.
229 See Judith lanelli, Lessening the Mens Rea Requirement for Hazardous Waste Violations, 16 VT.
L. REV. 419, 426 (1991) ("[Tlhe social stigma attached to a criminal proceeding ... can in itself be an
effective deterrent."). Japan's criminal justice system has also utilized public apology as an effective
deterrent. See John 0. Haley, Apology and Pardon: Learning from Japan, in CIVIC REPENTANCE 97, 105
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underutilized in Japan for environmental crimes because there have been
very few public trials.
230
Public stigma deterrence has especially strong potential to prevent
environmental crimes committed by corporations.23' American
commentators have concluded that "the notoriety gained by a corporation
subject to criminal charges can cause irreparable damage," particularly for
corporations that are prominent in the public eye.232 A report by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development once declared,
"In Japan, more than elsewhere, the business community wants to be loved
and to be considered a praiseworthy part of the national community.,
233
These particular aspects of Japanese society suggest that an enhanced
criminal enforcement program would strengthen deterrence of preventable
acts of pollution such as dumping and spills.
D. Japan Should Raise Maximum Criminal Fines for Environmental
Crimes to Strengthen Deterrence
In addition to public stigma deterrence, environmental crime laws in
the United States and Japan often provide economic deterrence through
criminal fines. 234  Criminal fines 235 deter intentional polluters by removing
(Amitai Etzioni ed., 1999) ("Apology can also be an end in itself, and as such it serves as an important
informal sanction.").
230 In 98.6% of cases in 1986, the person was tried in a summary procedure for the imposition of
fines, and only 49 persons were actually sent to trial. Oda, supra note 11, at 188. In 1994, of the 1994
persons prosecuted, 88 were required to stand trial as compared to 62 the previous year. ENVIRONMENT
AGENCY (1995), supra note 21, at 710. A summary trial was recommended for 96.6% of the persons
prosecuted. Id.
23! See Grover C. Wrenn, The Role of Environmental Consultants in Criminal Enforcement Matters,
C496 ALI-ABA 181, 186-87 (1990), available in WESTLAW, Texts & Periodicals-All Law Reviews,
Texts & Bar Journals; Opher Shweiki, Environmental Audit Privilege and Voluntary Disclosure Rule: The
Importance of Federal Enactment, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1219, 1233 (1996).
232 Hoffman, supra note 209, at 1046. See also Lazarus, supra note 216, at 880; Pappas, supra note
78, at 186.
233 Hirano, supra note 175, at 135.
234 For more on the criminal fine provisions in major U.S. environmental laws, see CARR ET AL.,
supra note 60, at 123-24, 126, 159, 196, 201-03, 277, 290. For recent translations of Japanese
environmental crime laws and the fines prescribed by them, see ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS (1996), supra note
11, at YA-YG.
235 The distinction between civil fines and criminal fines has been described as "hazy."
Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanction,
92 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1301 (1979). One commentator noted, "Aside from the label attached, there is
often no meaningful distinction between criminal and civil fines imposed on corporate defendants, and the
deterrent effect of each may be essentially the same." Id. at 1301. Besides the stigma attached to criminal
fines, there are differences in the degree of procedural protection afforded to the defendant. Id. In the
United States, these include the prohibition against double jeopardy, the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, and the right to a jury trial. Id. at 1302.
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some of the economic incentive to pollute.236 They also deter negligent acts
that result in pollution by giving potential polluters a strong incentive to use
care when handling environmentally harmful substances.237
Recently, Japan has taken steps to increase the fines that can be levied
for environmental crimes,238 but these fines still lag far behind those that can
be levied in the United States. 239 Commentators have argued that the illegal
dumping of industrial waste in Japan is tied in part to insufficient economic
penalties for such dumping. 240  As recently as 1996, the maximum criminal
fine for illegal waste dumping in Japan was one million yen, or about
$8,000.241 The inadequacy of this sanction was illustrated in a recent case in
which a waste disposal operator in Kagawa Prefecture was ordered to pay a
fine of 500,000 yen and was sentenced to a ten-month prison term with a
five-year stay of execution. 242  The defendant could hardly have been
deterred by such a fine, since he earned as much as 470 million yen from his
243illegal actions.
The maximum criminal fine for an oil spill in Japan 244 is significantly
smaller than the fine that can be imposed in the United States. With thepassage of the Criminal Fine Improvement Act of 1987 ("CFIA"), federal
236 For example, one commentator noted that the 1990 amendments to the Clean Air Act "attempted
to remove all economic incentive for violation by setting fines ranging up to twice the gross pecuniary loss
caused to a third party or twice the gross pecuniary gain to the defendant, whichever is greater." CARR ET
AL., suTra note 60, at 3. See also supra note 213.See supra notes 210-212.
238 In 1996, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, which is in charge of waste disposal administration,
began to draft amendments to the Waste Disposal Law in response to the rising number of illegal waste
dumping incidents. Tenfold Increase, supra note 189. Originally, government officials discussed raising
the maximum fine on illegal dumping to 10 million yen (at that time $93,400). Id. In fact, when Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto submitted a bill to the Diet in 1997, the revision called for increasing the
maximum penalty to 100 million yen, which would have made it one of the toughest legal penalties in
Japan. Amendments to Waste Disposal Law, supra note 193. An official at Japan's Sanitation Bureau
announced that the purpose of the amendment was to "make it unprofitable to conduct illegal waste
dumping." Tenfold Increase, supra note 189. In March 2000, the Cabinet approved a different bill that
would increase the maximum sentence for illegal dumping to five years and the maximum fine to 10
million yen for individuals and up to 100 million yen for corporations. Cabinet Approves Bill to Revise
Waste Law; Industry Must Ensure Proper Disposal, DAILY YOMIURI, Mar. 22, 2000, available in 2000 WL
4644960.
239 For example, RCRA provides for fines of $50,000 for each day that a hazardous waste violation
takes place. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d). CARR ET AL., supra note 60, at 183.
240 Kozo Nakada, Japan: Toxic Waste Management Market, AMERICAN EMBASSY REPORT pt. 2, May
29, 1997, available in 1997 WL 9850540.
241 Id. At an exchange rate of 125 yen to the dollar, this would be approximately $8,000. Id.
242 Tenfold Increase, supra note 189.243 Id. As the chairman of the National Federation of Industrial Waste Management Associations
stated, "There are plenty of openings for boryokudan [gangsters] in [the industrial waste] business. Even if
they have to pay $10,000 in fines, they make $1 million in profits." Gibney, supra note 178.244 The largest fine available under the Marine Pollution Law is 10,000,000 yen. Marine Pollution
Law, supra note 23, art. 55.
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prosecutors are now able to seek fines that are calculated based on the
pecuniary loss or gain caused by the defendant's criminal act.245 Between
1997 and 1998, federal prosecutors obtained multi-million dollar criminal
fines for oil pollution by Royal Caribbean Cruise Lines, 246 the operator of a
Holland America Cruise Line ship,247 and three companies responsible for
the North Cape oil spill. 248 Commentators have noted that Exxon may have
been coerced into paying its $125 million fine for the Exxon Valdez spill
because it faced the threat of facing an even larger CFIA-enhanced criminal
fine.24 9 By adopting similar legislation and continuing to raise the maximum
fines for environmental crimes, Japan could improve its deterrence of
pollution without any additional funding or significant change in its
enforcement structure.
V. CONCLUSION
Japan is faced with important decisions about the enforcement of its
environmental laws. In the 1970s and early 1980s, Japan relied on criminal
prosecution to deter certain types of pollution. Since the early 1980s,
however, Japan has used criminal enforcement mechanisms less frequently,
while the United States has rapidly expanded its environmental crime
program. A variety of factors have contributed to this divergence in
enforcement strategy, including the timing of major pollution incidents,
24 Pub. L. No. 100-185, 101 Stat. 1279 (1987) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (1994)). See generally
Raucher, supra note 83, at 177-78. The statute reads:
If any person derives pecuniary gain from the offense, or if the offense results in pecuniary loss
to a person other than the defendant, the defendant may be fined not more than the greater of
twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss, unless the imposition of a fine under this subsection
would unduly complicate or prolong the sentencing process.
18 U.S.C. § 3571(d).
246 The company was fined nine million dollars for illegally discharging oil and lying about it to
government investigators. Downs, supra note 65, at 211.
247 HAL Beheer BV was ordered to pay a one million dollar fine and one million dollars in restitution
for illegally discharging oily bilge into Alaska's Inside Passage. Id.2 Three companies, Eklof Marine Corporation, Thor Towing Corporation, and Odin Marine
Corporation, were fined a total of seven million dollars for releasing 825,000 gallons of oil into Block
Island and Rhode Island Sounds. Jane F. Barrett, U.S. Environmental Criminal Laws and the Maritime
Industry, BIMCO BULL., Apr. 1998, at 49.
249 See Larry Howell, Environmental Crimes. The Boom in "Busting" Corporations and Their
Responsible Officers, 16 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 417, 429 (1992); Raucher, supra note 83, at 177-78.
250 The U.S. federal criminal enforcement program pays for itself by bringing in two dollars in fines
for every dollar spent on enforcement. Criminal Enforcement: 1990 Record Year for Criminal
Enforcement of Environmental Violators, Justice Announces, 21 ENV'T REP. 1397 (1990).
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different organizational structures for enforcement personnel, and different
regulatory strategies and case law.
In recent years, Japan has been plagued by large oil spills and illegal
industrial waste dumping. Many of these incidents were caused by
intentional or negligent conduct and were thus preventable. Japan can deter
these sources of pollution by aggressively enforcing its environmental crime
laws. Criminal prosecutions resulting in large fines, public stigma, and
incarceration can have a strong deterrent effect on potential polluters. As
discussed in Part III, the United States has had a very successful federal
environmental crime program. This program could serve as a valuable
model for future improvements to the Japanese system, particularly in the
areas of investigator training and placement. Japan should continue to raise
the maximum fines for environmental crimes. By returning to its criminal
enforcement "roots," Japan can continue to protect its people and its
environment from oil spills and illegal waste disposal.
